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by 
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A review of the definition of “investor” and investor-state dispute resolution clauses in 
851 international investment agreements (IIAs) 1  reveals that, except in two, state-
controlled entities (SCEs) (sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) 
have equivalent standing to their purely private counterparts as investors under such IIAs. 
 
In particular, of the 851 IIAs reviewed:2 
 
• 691 IIAs do not define “investor” such that it would exclude SCEs as the definition is 
not based on the nature of ownership but, rather, on whether a legal person was duly 
constituted, incorporated, established, or organized in accordance with the law of a 
contracting party. Therefore, if an SCE is established as required under the law of a 
contracting party, it qualifies as an “investor.” 
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1
 The IIAs reviewed include the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of countries that account for 70% of 
world foreign direct investment outflows in the period 2008-2010; BITs of certain countries, such as the 
United Arab Emirates, that are home to the top ten largest SWFs as ranked (by assets under management) 
by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute; the model BITs of Canada, France, Germany, Norway, United 
States, and United Kingdom; a cross-section of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment 
chapters, such as the North-American Free Trade Agreement and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement; as well as bilateral FTAs to which at least one of the 
sample states is a party; and multilateral agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty. 
2
 The figures below do not add up to 851 as the IIAs falling in the second and third category below overlap 
in some cases. 
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• 81 IIAs define an “investor” to include a “state enterprise” as well as entities that are 
government owned and controlled, thereby expressly capturing SCEs. 
 
• 52 IIAs explicitly provide that an “investor” includes the government of a contracting 
party and/or such contracting party itself. Such IIAs do not preclude a contracting 
party from acting in the capacity of an investor through an SCE. 
 
• None of the IIAs exclude SCEs from the definition of an “investor” on the basis that 
such entities have not been organized primarily for the purpose of profit or do not 
carry out investments motivated by pecuniary gain. Thus, the IIAs do not appear to 
disqualify certain SCEs, such as government institutions, development funds and 
monetary agencies that may not strictly be established for pecuniary gain. 
 
• Only two IIAs expressly exclude the SOEs of one contracting party.3 Both IIAs were 
concluded in 1983 and are otherwise silent on the status of SOEs. 
 
• 33 IIAs do not contain a definition of “investor.” 
 
Therefore, SCEs generally have recourse to the investor-state dispute resolution 
provisions of IIAs as “investors.” In particular, as approximately 78% of the IIAs 
surveyed allow for investor-state dispute resolution before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention), in most cases, SCEs will have recourse to the ICSID dispute resolution 
framework as “investors.” 
 
There is some debate among scholars regarding whether SCE access to the ICSID 
framework as investors should be limited if the IIA otherwise covers SCEs in the 
definition of an “investor.” The text and negotiating history of the ICSID Convention do 
not unequivocally address the standing of SCEs as a diverse class of investors. In 
addition, the handful of ICSID arbitral decisions which have addressed this issue did not 
establish clear guidelines regarding the extent to which SCEs are able to initiate claims as 
investors under IIAs.4 
 
We should be mindful that if indeed SCE access to the ICSID framework as investors is 
somehow limited as suggested by certain scholars, 5  SCEs might well turn to other 
avenues of dispute resolution. The majority of IIAs that grant SCEs access to ICSID also 
enable SCEs to elect to refer an investment dispute to an arbitral institution other than 
ICSID, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, and/or pursuant to arbitral rules 
                                                     
3
 The Panama BITs with Germany and Switzerland. 
4
 See e.g. Československa Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, decision 
on objections to jurisdiction (May 24, 1999). 
5
 See e.g. Paul Blyschak, “State-owned enterprises and international investment treaties: When are state-
owned entities and their investments protected?,’ Journal of International Law and International Relations, 
vol. 6 (Spring 2011), pp. 1-52, at 29-34; and Mark Feldman, “The standing of state-owned entities under 
investment treaties,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-
2011 (New York: OUP, 2011), pp. 615-637. 
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other than the ICSID Convention, such as those of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
 
As the number of treaty-based investment arbitrations is growing alongside increased 
levels of foreign direct investment by SCEs, 6  it is likely that investment disputes 
involving SCEs as claimants will occur with greater frequency going forward. Thus, in 
the long term, any limits on the access of SCEs to ICSID may diminish the institutional 
significance of ICSID. 
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